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apprise IRS of the nature of the transferred and retained
interests.
Retained interests in trust or term interests in property
generally are valued at zero for federal gift tax purposes
unless in the form of an annuity or unitrust interest.
If two or more members of the same family acquire
interests in the same transaction or series of related
transactions, the person or persons acquiring the term
interests in the property are treated as having acquired the
entire property and then transferred to the other persons the
interests acquired by the other persons in the transaction or
transactions.  The transfer is treated as made in exchange for
the consideration, if any, provided for the acquisition of
interests in the property.  This could involve joint purchase
of a life estate and remainder.
Relative to buy-sell agreements, the legislation provides
that the value of property is determined without regard to any
option, agreement, right or restriction unless—
(1) the option, agreement, right or restriction is a bona
fide business arrangement;
(2) the option, agreement, right or restriction is not a
device to transfer the property to members of the decedent's
family for less than full and adequate consideration; and
(3) the terms of the option, agreement, right or
restriction are comparable to those obtained in similar
arrangements entered into by persons in an arm's length
transaction.
The Conference report indicates that it is not the intent
that a buy-sell agreement be ignored merely because its terms
differ from those used by another, similarly situated firm.
General business practice may recognize more than one
valuation approach even within the same industry.
Under the legislation, the value of property is determined
without regard to any restriction other than a restriction
which by its terms will never lapse.  In addition, any right
held by the decedent with respect to property includible in the
gross estate which lapses on the decedent's death would, in
valuing the property in the estate, be considered to be
exercisable by the estate.  Any restriction that effectively
limits the ability of a corporation or partnership to liquidate
is ignored in valuing a transfer among family members if—
(1) the transferor and family members control the
corporation or partnership and (2) the restriction either lapses
after the transfer or can be removed by the transferor or
members of the family, either alone or collectively.  This
rule does not apply to a restriction arising as part of a
financing with an unrelated party (which is commercially
reasonable) or a restriction required under state or federal law.
Regulatory authority is given to disregard other restrictions
which reduce the value of the transferred interest for transfer
tax purposes but which do not ultimately reduce the value of
the interest to the transferee.  RRA 1990, Secs. 1 1 6 0 1 ,
11602, adding I.R.C. § 2701 et seq.
The amendments apply to gifts after October 8, 1990;
transfers after October 8, 1990; to agreements, options,
rights or restrictions entered into after October 8, 1990; to
agreements, options, rights or restrictions which are
substantially modified after October 8, 1990; and to restric-
tions or rights created after October 8, 1990.
36. Disabled access credit.  An eligible small
business is allowed a nonrefundable income tax credit equal
to 50 percent of the amount of eligible public
accommodations access expenditures for any taxable year that
exceed $250 but do not exceed $10,250.
An eligible small business is defined as a person with
gross receipts for the preceding taxable year that did not
exceed $1 million or had no more than 30 full-time
employees during the preceding taxable year.
Eligible access expenditures generally include amounts
paid or incurred–
(1) for the purpose of removing architectural,
communication, physical or transportation barriers which
prevent a business from being accessible to or usable by
individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide qualified interpreters or other effective
methods of making orally delivered materials available to
those with hearing impairments;
(3) to provide qualified readers taped texts and other
effective methods of making visually delivered materials
available to individuals with visual impairments;
(4) to acquire or modify equipment or devices for
individuals with disabilities; and
(5) to provide other similar services, modifications,
materials or equipment.
All expenditures must be reasonable and necessary to
accomplish the stated purposes.
The disabled access credit is included as a general business
credit.  The portion of any unused business credit attributable
to the disabled access credit may not be carried back to any
taxable year ending before the date of enactment.
The provision is effective for expenditures paid or
incurred after the date of enactment.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor's interest in a retirement
plan was not excluded from the bankruptcy estate as a
spendthrift trust because the debtor could receive the funds in
the plan upon termination of employment.  The debtor's
interest in the plan, totaling over $12,000, was exempt under
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.430(10(e), as necessary for the debtor's
support where the debtor's income was insufficient for the
debtor's and the debtor's child's support and no evidence was
shown that the debtor would have any significant increase in
income.  The court indicated that the amount of the interest
in the retirement plan was also a factor favoring the exemp-
tion.  In re  Boykin, 118 B.R. 716 (Bankr. W . D .
Mo. 1990).
The debtor was not allowed an exemption for IRA and
Keogh accounts under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(a)(10)(c)
because the funds were not necessary for the debtor's support.
The court found that the debtor was a 59 year old attorney
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with the ability to earn sufficient amounts to accumulate
retirement funds.  In re  Herzog, 118 B.R. 5 2 9
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
The debtor owned funds in an ERISA qualified retirement
plan carried by the debtor's former employer.  At the time of
filling bankruptcy, the debtor could withdraw amounts
contributed to the plan.  The court held that the debtor's
interest in the plan was estate property subject to turnover to
the estate and that such turnover would not effect the tax
status of the plan for other employees.  In re Threet, 1 1 8
B.R. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS.  The foreclosure sale of
of the debtor's residence at 69.5 percent of fair market value
was held to be not less than a reasonably equivalent value
and not a fraudulent transfer under Section 548.  The court
reasoned that the amount received was not unreasonable for a
foreclosure sale even though the residence might have sold
for more through a typical private sale.  In re  Barrett,
118 B.R. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'g  113 B . R .
175 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), on rem. from  1 1 1
B.R. 78 (E.D. Pa. 1990), vac'g and rem'g  1 0 4
B.R. 688 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
Within 14 months prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtors
transferred their 20 percent interest in a farm to their children
pursuant to an oral agreement made several years earlier.  The
bankruptcy court had ruled that the transfer was not fraudu-
lent under Kansas law because the children did not participate
in the fraud and did not have any knowledge of circumstances
under which knowledge of the fraud could be imparted to
them.  The district court upheld the lower court because the
rule of law was established by the Kansas Supreme Court.
In addition, the court held that the children had given consid-
eration for the interest in the farm because the parents were
allowed to use the farm rent free during their lifetimes.  In
re  Kennedy, 118 B.R. 792 (D. Kan. 1990).
  CHAPTER 12
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtor was held to be eligible for
Chapter 12 where, although more than 50 percent of the
debtor's income came from the cash rental of farmland, the
debtor had a "significant degree if engagement in, and played
a significant operational role in, the production of crops" on
the rented land.  The debtor had helped maintain the fences,
had planted the set-aside acres, and had helped "walk" the
beans grown on the land.  In addition, the debtor was eligible
under the 80 percent debt-from-farming requirement where the
debtor was actively involved in the hog confinement opera-
tion financed by the debtor.  In re  Easton, 118 B . R .
676 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990), on rem. from, 8 8 3
F.2d 630 (8th cir. 1990), vac'g and rem'g , 1 0 4
B.R. 111 (N.D. Iowa 1989), aff'g , 79 B.R. 8 3 6
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988).
PLAN.  The Chapter 12 trustee filed a motion for deter-
mination of the debtor's disposable income and turnover of
such income.  The court held that the burden of proof of
disposable income is on the debtor and allowed the debtor a
hearing to rebut the trustee's evidence of additional disposable
income during two years of the plan.  In re  Kuhlman,
118 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The Chapter 11
debtor continued to operate the business after filing for
bankruptcy and became liable for interest on unpaid taxes
incurred post-petition.  The court held that the post-petition
interest and taxes were entitled to administrative expense
priority.  In re Flo-Lizer, Inc., 90-2 U.S.Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,546 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g , 107 B . R
143 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
CLAIMS.  The IRS was barred from filing a late claim
although the late claim resulted from a notice to the IRS of
the debtor corporation's bankruptcy with an incorrect tax-
payer identification number.  In re  Ohio Movers &
Storage, Inc., 118 B.R. 533 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990) .
The IRS claim for taxes was held to be an allowed
secured claim although the claim was secured by property in
which the debtors claimed an exemption.  The court held that
the determination as to whether the property was estate prop-
erty was to be made as of the filing of the petition, before
exemptions are claimed and allowed.  In re  Hall, 1 1 8
B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
PRIORITY.  The IRS had filed a claim for taxes under
I.R.C. § 4971 assessed against the debtor for failure to fully
fund an ERISA plan.  The court held that the tax assessed
under Section 4971 was a penalty not eligible for priority
under Section 507(a)(7) and was to be subordinated under the
claims of general unsecured creditors.  In re  Mansfield
Tire & Rubber Co., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,549 (E.D. Ohio 1990), aff'g , 80 B.R. 3 9 5
(Bankr. E.D. Ohio 1987).
Pre-petition interest on a pre-petition claim for taxes was
allowed the same priority as the taxes.  U.S. v. S towe ,
90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,559 (D. N . D .
Ind. 1990).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  The debtor was a treasurer
and 50 percent shareholder in two corporations which failed
to make withholding tax payments.  The court held that the
debtor was liable for the 100 percent penalty as a responsible
person in the corporations where the debtor knew the with-
holding taxes were not being paid.  In re  Mason, 1 1 8
B.R. 170 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
RETURNS.  In 1987, the debtor filed tax returns for
1981, 1982 and 1983, using the "married filing single"
status.  The debtor attempted to file amended returns in 1989
using the "married filing jointly" status.  The court held that
because more than three years had elapsed since the filing
date for the returns, Section 6013 prevented the debtor from
electing the married status on the amended returns.  In re
Stallings, 118 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1989).
CONTRACTS
BREACH.  The defendant contracted with the plaintiff
for aerial spraying of postemergence herbicide.  The plaintiff
sprayed only part of the land but sprayed the remainder after
the defendant complained that part of the land was missed.
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             235
The plaintiff sued for nonpayment and the defendant argued
that the plaintiff should be entitled to payment only for the
chemicals timely applied.  The court held that the evidence
supported the finding that the charges were reasonable for the
services rendered.  The court allowed interest on the charges
equal to the rate charged by the plaintiff on overdue accounts
but disallowed additional statutory interest on the judgment.
Carson Grain & Implement, Inc. v. Dirks, 4 6 0
N.W.2d 483 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
CONTRACT.  The cross-claim plaintiff agreed to lend
$135,000 to a rancher for the purchase of cattle from the
cross-claim defendant who, in turn, agreed to repurchase the
cattle some months later.  The cross-claim defendant, how-
ever, applied the proceeds of the loan to offset other amounts
owed by the rancher to the cross-claim defendant.  The court
held that sufficient evidence of a contract was presented and
that the cross-claim defendant breached the contract by not
delivering the cattle.  Federal Land Bank of Omaha v .
Emberton, 460 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa Ct. App.
1990) .
FRAUD .  The plaintiff leased a cattle silage storage
system after the defendant's sales representatives stated that
the system would keep the silage in an "oxygen-limited"
condition.  The plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer of
the system for fraud after the plaintiff's dairy cattle became ill
and decreased production after being fed silage stored in the
system.  The court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence of all elements of fraud in that the defendant,
through its sales representatives and promotional materials,
represented that the system would prevent oxygen from
reaching the silage stored in the system when the defendant's
own studies demonstrated that the system did not always
prevent oxygen from reaching the silage.  The court upheld
the jury award of damages for the loss of production and rent
paid.  Lollar v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products,
Inc., 795 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has issued an interim
rule changing the classification of Arkansas from Class B to
Class A under the brucellosis regulations.  55 Fed. R e g .
42954 (Oct. 25, 1990).
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
state of North Dakota acquired farmland under mortgage fore-
closures and applied to place the land under CRP within four
months.  The application was denied under 7 U.S.C. §
3835(a)(1)(C), because of an administratively-developed
standard that land acquired after October 1, 1985 and held less
than three years was presumed to have been acquired for the
purpose of placing the land in CRP.  The court held that the
exception provided by Section 3835(a)91)(C) was not
judicially reviewable because the exception was discretionary
with the Secretary of Agriculture.  The court also held that
the Secretary was not required to promulgate regulations
establishing standards for application of the exception in
Section 3835(a)(1)(C).  State of N.D. ex. rel. Bd. o f
Univ. & School Lands v. Yeutter, 914 F.2d 1031
(8th Cir. 1990), aff'g in part and rev'g in part ,
711 F.Supp. 517 (D. N.D. 1989).
FARM LOANS .  The FmHA has adopted as final
amendments to the farm loan regulations requiring credit
bureau reports on all new and rescheduled loans and screening
for previous debts with the FmHA.  55 Fed. Reg. 46187
(Nov. 2, 1990).
MILK.  The AMS has issued a proposed rule merging
the milk marketing areas of the Rio Grande Valley,
Lubbock-Plainview, Texas Panhandle and all unregulated
areas in New Mexico into one marking order.  55 Fed.
Reg. 43345 (Oct. 29, 1990).
PESTICIDES.  The EPA has issued proposed rules
which amend the rules governing the certification of applica-
tors of restricted pesticides.  The amendments include estab-
lishment of private applicator categories, elimination of the
non reader provision, elimination of the exemption for
medical doctors and veterinarians, and establishment of
additional commercial applicator categories.  55 Fed. R e g .
46690 (Nov. 7, 1990).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS.  The taxpayer received securities by
gift six days before the donor died.  The decedent's will
bequeathed property in trust to the taxpayer.  If the securities
had not been transferred prior to the decedent's death, the
securities would pass under the will to the taxpayer in trust.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer could make a qualified
disclaimer of the intervivos gift within nine months after the
gift and that the passing of the securities to the taxpayer in
trust under the will did not disqualify the disclaimer.  Ltr.
Rul. 9043050, July 31, 1990.
GIFT.  The taxpayer received property from the decedent,
the taxpayer's sister, through the state laws of intestacy and
transferred the property to a third party according to the
wishes of the decedent.  The IRS ruled that the transfer of the
property to the third party was a gift from the taxpayer.
Ltr. Rul. 9042047, July 24, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS .  The
surviving spouse received a life estate interest in several
assets which included the power to sell, use or pledge the
assets and for which the estate elected QTIP treatment.  The
IRS ruled that, under Section 2652(a), the estate may also
elect to treat the QTIP property as if no QTIP election was
made such that the surviving spouse will be subject to any
GSTT as to the property.  Ltr. Rul. 9043028, July
27, 1990.
The grantor established an intervivos trust which provided
for equal shares for each of the grantor's children and the
grandchildren of any deceased child.  While all of the
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grantor's children were still living and before any
grandchildren were born, the trust was amended to exclude the
grandchildren as possible beneficiaries.  The IRS held that
distributions from the amended trust would not be subject to
GSTT because none of the beneficiaries was a skip person.
Ltr. Rul. 9043061, Aug. 1, 1990.
GROSS ESTATE.  The taxpayer's will provided for
the establishment of a trust which provided income for life
for the surviving spouse with the remainder to pass to the
couple's children.  The surviving spouse had no power of
appointment over trust corpus but had the power to prohibit
the trustee from selling any corporation stock held by the
trust.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's veto power
over sales of stock would not cause inclusion of trust corpus
in the surviving spouse's gross estate.  Ltr. R u l .
9042048, July 24, 1990.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's taxable
estate included property passing to the spouse under the will
which was not eligible for the marital deduction and property
held by the decedent and surviving spouse as tenants by the
entireties which passed outside of the will and which was
eligible for the marital deduction.  The decedent's will stated
that real property passing under the will was not to be used
to pay any state or federal estate taxes; however, the residuary
estate was insufficient to pay the taxes due.  The estate
allocated the remaining taxes against the real estate, arguing
that under Virginia law, the decedent could not encumber the
entireties property without the consent of the spouse.  The
court held that federal law controlled and that the decedent's
provision that taxes were not to be charged against the real
property passing under the will required the remaining taxes
to be charged against the property passing outside of the
will, thus decreasing the property eligible for the marital
deduction.  Est. of Reno, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,046 (4th Cir. 1990).
An estate was not allowed a marital deduction for a
surviving spouse's interest in QTIP property where no QTIP
election was made on the estate tax return.  In addition, the
QTIP election was not allowed on an amended return.
Robinson v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,045 (S.D. Calif. 1990).
The decedent's will, executed in 1979, bequeathed prop-
erty in trust to the surviving spouse equal to the "maximum
estate tax marital deduction allowable" less the amount of
other property eligible for the marital deduction and any
amount of property which would result in no federal estate
tax.  The court held that the will did not contain a formula
clause subject to the ERTA transition rules and that the full
unlimited marital deduction was available to the estate.  Est.
of Kendall v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-547.
In 1980, the decedent had established a testamentary trust
to be funded with property equal to the maximum marital
deduction less other credits available to the estate.  The
decedent amended the trust in 1985.  the IRS ruled that
because the trust was amended after passage of ERTA, the
transitional rule of ERTA did not apply and the unlimited
marital deduction was available to the decedent's estate for the
trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9042020, July 19, 1990.
The decedent's estate proposed to elect QTIP treatment for
a fraction of property eligible for QTIP.  The fraction of
property so elected equaled (1) the smallest amount of the
deduction under section 2056(b)(7) that resulted in no federal
estate tax after utilization of the maximum amount of
available unified credit divided by (2) the value of all QTIP
property.  The IRS ruled that the fractional election was
allowed.  Ltr. Rul. 9043015, July 26, 1990.
The surviving spouse received interests in two trusts.
Under both trusts the surviving spouse received all income at
least quarterly and could receive corpus for support.  The
remainder of the first trust went to named beneficiaries and to
the second trust.  The remainder of the second trust went to
named charities.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's
interests in the trusts were eligible for the marital deduction.
The IRS also ruled that the surviving spouse's estate will be
eligible for a charitable deduction for the trust property pass-
ing to the charities.  Ltr. Rul. 9043016, July 2 6 ,
1990 .
The surviving spouse received a life estate interest in
several assets which included the power to sell, use or pledge
the assets.  The IRS ruled that the life estate interests were
QTIP and if the QTIP election is made for specific property
and inadequate records are not maintained as to the use and
disposition of QTIP property, non-QTIP property of equal
value will be includible in the surviving spouse's estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9043028, July 27, 1990.
The decedent's will established two trusts, one providing
lifetime income for the surviving spouse with the trustee
having power to distribute principal to the spouse and with
the spouse having the power to require the sale of unproduc-
tive trust assets.  The other trust also provides income to the
surviving spouse but cannot distribute principal unless the
first trust is exhausted.  The surviving spouse is on a
committee with the power to change the trustee of the second
trust but the spouse may not be the trustee of the second
trust.  A QTIP election was made for the first but not the
second trust.  The IRS ruled that the assets of the second
trust are not includible in the surviving spouse's estate by
reason of the spouse's power to vote to change the trustee.
Ltr. Rul. 9043052, July 31, 1990.
The taxpayer proposed to establish two trusts, one trust
is to be funded by an IRA and the other is to receive income
and distributions from the IRA trust.  The surviving spouse
is the lifetime beneficiary of the second trust.  The IRS ruled
that the second trust was eligible QTIP.  Ltr. R u l .
9043054, July 31, 1990.
The decedent's will established a trust for the surviving
spouse who was not a U.S. citizen.  The spouse was also the
trustee of the trust.  The trust would have qualified as QTIP
except that the surviving spouse was not a U.S. citizen and
was the trustee.  The spouse proposed to create a new trust
with a U.S. trustee and including the assets of the nonquali-
fying trust.  The IRS ruled that the new trust would qualify
as a Qualified Domestic Trust and would be eligible for the
QTIP marital deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 9043070, Aug. 3 ,
1990 .
SAVINGS BONDS.  The decedent had purchased sav-
ings bonds with the decedent and another person as beneficia-
ries but the decedent did not tell the other person about the
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purchases.  The IRS ruled that no gift of the cotenancy
interest in the bonds was completed.  The IRS also ruled that
the other person may disclaim any interest in the bonds
within nine months after the death of the decedent.  If the
other person does not disclaim any interest in the bonds and
the bonds are redeemed by the decedent's estate with the
proceeds distributed to other persons, the co-owner will be
considered to have made a gift of those bonds and will realize
income from any accrued interest on the bonds.  Ltr. R u l .
9043043, July 31, 1990.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  Special use valua-
tion property was held by two trusts.  The surviving spouse
was the beneficiary of both trusts but under the second trust
income could be distributed to the decedent's issue if the first
trust provided the surviving spouse with sufficient income.
The IRS ruled that the net cash rental of the special use
valued land to a qualified heir by the first trust was not a
cessation of qualified use under Section 2032A(b)(5)(A).
However, the net cash rental by the second trust would be a
cessation of qualified use because persons other than the
surviving spouse could receive income from the trust.  Ltr.
Rul. 9043044, July 31, 1990.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
In 1979, the two shareholders of a corporation entered into a
buy-sell agreement which required both shareholders to first
offer any stock for sale to the corporation and upon the death
of either shareholder the surviving shareholder was required to
purchase the decedent's stock.  The purchase price was set as
the per share book value at the time of the event causing the
sale.  The agreement was amended in 1982.  The IRS ruled
that because the agreement was entered into and amended
before adoption of I.R.C. § 2036(c), the buy-sell agreement
was not a disproportionate transfer.  Ltr. Rul. 9043071 ,
Aug. 2, 1990.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COST SHARE PAYMENTS .  The USDA has
determined that payments under the Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control Program are made primarily for the pur-
poses of soil and water conservation, protecting or restoring
the environment, or providing a habitat for wildlife.  There-
fore, payments under the program are excludible from income
under I.R.C. § 126.  55 Fed. Reg. 42868 (Oct. 2 4 ,
1990) .
DEPLETION.  On the date of death, the decedent
owned working and royalty interests in producing oil and gas
property which was community property.  The surviving
spouse filed a joint return for the calendar tax year of the
decedent's death.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse
must calculate the depletion allowance using either the cost
depletion method or the percentage depletion method,
whichever produces the largest allowance.  The surviving
spouse's basis in the property is the basis as determined
under I.R.C. § 1014.  Ltr. Rul. 9042002, Jan. 1 0 ,
1990 .
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The tax-
payer controlled a corporation and owed a debt to the corpora-
tion's subsidiary.  In satisfaction of the debt to the sub-
sidiary, the taxpayer had the corporation issue a promissory
note to the subsidiary.  The court held that the taxpayer
realized income from the discharge of indebtedness because
the promissory note was worthless because the corporation
had no assets.  Yamamoto v. Comm'r , T.C. Memo.
1990-549 .
INSTALLMENT REPORTING.  Through the error
of an income tax preparer, the entire gain from the
installment sale of real property was reported on the
taxpayer's return for the year of sale.  The error was not
discovered for two years when a new accountant was used.
The IRS ruled that because no written memorandum existed
which indicated that the taxpayer intended to make an
election to use the installment reporting of the income, the
election not to use installment reporting could not be
revoked.  The ruling did not cite any authority for the written
memorandum requirement.  Ltr. Rul. 9042014, July
18, 1990.
INTEREST.  The taxpayer established trusts for a niece
and nephew.  The trusts were funded with cash, but shortly
after the trusts were funded the taxpayer borrowed the funds
in exchange for promissory notes bearing 20 percent interest.
The court denied the taxpayer deductions for interest paid on
the notes where, under California law, the notes were consid-
ered promises to make future gifts.  Martyr v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1990-558.
LIENS.  The IRS has issued a table listing the amount
of wages exempt from levy under I.R.C. § 6334(d) for the
various filing statuses and wage periods.  Notice 90 -65 ,
I.R.B. 1990-45, 35.
LIFE INSURANCE .  A corporation in which the
taxpayer was a majority shareholder transferred a life insur-
ance policy on the life of the taxpayer to a partnership of
which the taxpayer was a partner.  The partner paid the
corporation the cash value of the policy.  The IRS ruled that
the proceeds of the policy will be excludible from gross
income under I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).  Ltr. Rul. 9042023 ,
July 19, 1990.
  PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The part-
nership elected its accountant as its managing partner and tax
matters partner; however, the accountant did not own a
capital or profits interest in the partnership.  In response to a
final partnership administrative adjustment, the accountant
authorized a petition for readjustment.  The court held that
the accountant could not serve as a tax matters partner
because the accountant did not own a capital or profits
interest in the partnership.  The partnership was allowed 60
days to file an amended petition.  Montana Sapphire
Assoc., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 34 (1990).
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AT-RISK RULES.  The taxpayers were limited partners
in a partnership involved in leasing computer equipment.
the Tax Court had originally held that the taxpayers' invest-
ments in the partnership were held "other than interests as
creditors" and that deductions relating to those interests were
not allowed under I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(A).  Upon reconsidera-
tion, the court held that because the investment related only
to contracts to develop computer software, the activity
invested in was not governed by section 465(b)(3)(A) because
the statute was dependent upon a listing of covered activities
by regulations to be issued.  Because the regulations have
been issued, the taxpayers' investments were not limited by
the at-risk rules.  The court also held that Jackson v .
Comm'r, 86 T.C. 492 (1988), aff'd on other issues, 89-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 9123 (10th Cir. 1989), and its
progeny would no longer be followed.  Alexander v .
Comm'r, 95 T.C. (1990), rev'g , T.C. Memo.
1990-141 .
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES .  Although the
instructions to Form 4835 state that non-material participa-
tion share leases are eligible for the $25,000 deduction of
passive activity losses, the temporary regulations, Example
8, state that a crop share lease is to be considered a joint
venture and not rental real estate and not eligible for the
$25,000 deduction.  In a letter to Senator Charles Grassley of
Iowa, Kenneth Gideon, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) has
reiterated the rule in Example 8 but without mentioning the
instructions to Form 4835.  Highlights & Documents,
Nov. 9, 1990, p. 1351.
PENALTIES.  The IRS has announced that for January
1, 1991 through March 31, 1991, the interest rate on under-
payment of federal taxes continues at 11 percent and on
overpayment remains at 10 percent.  Rev. Rul. 90 -94 ,
1990-46, 4.
  S CORPORATIONS  
TERMINATION.  The termination of a corporation's S
corporation status was ruled inadvertent where the trustee of
two trusts which held corporation stock failed to make
current distributions of corporation income but loaned the
money back to the corporation.  Ltr. Rul. 9042010 ,
July 12, 1990.
The termination of a corporation's S corporation status
was ruled inadvertent where the stock of the corporation was
issued to a trust which allowed the accumulation of income
and where upon discovery of this fact, the trust sold the stock
to another eligible shareholder.  Ltr. Rul. 9043030 ,
July 30, 1990.
The termination of a corporation's S corporation status
was ruled inadvertent where the stock of the corporation was
transferred by a shareholder's estate to a trust which was not
an eligible shareholder and where, upon discovery of the
termination, the stock was transferred to an eligible trust in
exchange for assets of equal value.  The income from both of
the trusts involved was paid to the shareholder's surviving
spouse.  Ltr. Rul. 9043032, July 30, 1990.
SOCIAL SECURITY.  The SSA has announced that
the wage amount for a a quarter of coverage in 1991 is $540;
the monthly exempt amount of wages for 1991 is $810 for
beneficiaries age 65 through 69 and $590 for beneficiaries
under age 65; the cost-of-living increase in benefits for 1991
is 5.4 percent; and the supplemental security income for
1991 is $407 for eligible individuals, $610 for eligible
individuals with an eligible spouse, and $204 for an essential
person.  55 Fed. Reg. 45856 (Oct. 31, 1990).
MORTGAGES
DEFICIENCY.  The plaintiff obtained a foreclosure
judgment against the defendants in 1983, an in rem judgment
against additional property in 1986 with a sale of the addi-
tional property later in 1986, and another judgment against
additional property in 1988.  The defendants filed a motion
for discharge of judgment, arguing that the two year limita-
tion on deficiency judgments, Iowa Code § 654.1, barred the
1988 action.  The court held that the continuing jurisdiction
of the trial court over the foreclosure judgment and related
deficiency actions meant that the case was pending on June
1, 1986 when the ruling in Federal Land Bank of Omaha v .
Lockard, 446 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1989) became effective.
The court in Lockard held that deficiency judgments barred
under Iowa Code § 654.6 would be allowed to be enforced
until July 1, 1990.  Therefore, the 1988 deficiency action
was not barred.  Federal Land Bank of Omaha v .
Recker, 460 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
NEGLIGENCE
RECREATIONAL USE.  The plaintiff was injured
while diving into a pond located on the defendant's property
without the permission of the defendant.  The defendant had
posted no trespassing signs on the property.  The court held
that the defendant was not liable for the injury under Iowa
Code §§ 111C.3 and .4 which states that a landowner owes
no duty to recreational users.  The court held that the statutes
apply whether or not the recreational users were invited or
not to use the property.  Peterson v. Schwertley, 4 6 0
N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 1990).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CORN HUSKER.  The plaintiff was injured when the
plaintiff's hand was caught in the rollers of a corn husker
when the plaintiff attempted to remove some corn while the
machine was running.  The defendant manufacturer filed a
third party action against the employer.  The court held that
sufficient evidence was presented to the jury of the plaintiff's
knowledge of the risk for the jury to allocate fault between
the plaintiff and the manufacturer.  As between the plaintiff
and the manufacturer, the jury had allocated 55 percent of the
fault to the manufacturer but in the third party action, as
between the manufacturer and the employer, the jury
allocated all of the fault to the employer.  The court held that
the allocation in the third party action was an improper award
of indemnity by the jury.  Hackett v. Equipment
Specialists, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. Ct. App.
1990) .
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DAMAGES.  The plaintiff insurance company brought
an action for damages under the Indiana Products Liability
Act, Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5 et seq., to recover amounts paid to
its insured when an electrical switch made by the defendants
failed to turn on ventilation fans in a poultry house causing
suffocation of the poultry.  The court held that privity
between the plaintiff and the defendants was not required by
the act and that as a subrogee of the user/insured, the plaintiff
could bring an action under the act.  The court also ruled that
the plaintiff could recover economic as well as compensatory
damages because the injury to the poultry was sudden and
major.  Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of America
v. Lake Shore Elec. Corp., 744 F.Supp. 8 6 4
(S.D. Ind. 1990).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FARM EQUIPMENT.  Tree stump harvesting equip-
ment was not farming equipment where the debtor did not
cultivate or care for crops but merely removed tree stumps
from forested areas.  Therefore, the creditor's filing of a
security interest in the county clerk's office was insufficient
to perfect the security interest in the equipment under S.C.
Code § 36-9-401.  In re Creel, 118 B.R. 372 (Bankr.
D. S.C. 1988).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
PESTICIDES.  The plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that California Proposition 65 requirements for
warnings on labels of pesticides were pre-empted by the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act.  The court held that the
state warning requirements were not pre-empted by FIFRA or
FHSA.  Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v .
Allenby, 744 F.Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION.  The plain-
tiff was a honey processor who applied for a manufacturer's
exemption under 72 Pa. Stat. § 7602.  The court held that
the processing of raw honey into edible honey was not a
manufacturing process eligible for the exemption.  Stewart
Honeybee Products, Inc. v. Board of Finance,
579 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1990).
VALUATION.  The plaintiffs operated a cattle feedlot
which was assessed for property tax purposes at a value
using the cost of the facilities to determine value.  The board
of assessment used only the cost method because it lacked
evidence of comparable sales within the county where the
facility was located.  The court held to be improper the
board's refusal to consider evidence of comparable sales
within the vicinity of the plaintiff's facility even though not
in the same county, especially when such comparable sales
indicated a valuation of one-third of the value reached by the
cost method.  Board of Assessment Appeals v. E .E .
Sonnenberg, 797 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1990).
WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
STABLE WORKER.  The claimant was hired to take
care of and oversee the breeding and foaling of thoroughbred
race horses and was injured while picking up a sack of feed.
The court held that the claimant was not an agricultural
worker exempt from workers' compensation coverage because
the employment involved the raising of domestic animals.
The claimant was also held not to be an independent contrac-
tor because the employment was indefinite and the salary was
based on time and not any particular project.  Sport
O'Kings Farms v. Thomas, 797 P.2d 1016 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1990).
ZONING
PERMITTED USES.  The petitioner owned 57 acres
of land within an exclusive farm use zone and wanted to
build a non-farm residence on seven acres.  The petitioner
argued that the non-farm use of the seven acres was allowed
under Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.283(3)(d), because the seven acres
were not suitable for farming.  The court held that because
the remaining 47 acres were generally suitable for farming,
the non-farm use of the seven acres was not allowed.
Smith v. Clackamas County, 103 Or. App. 3 7 0 ,
797 P.2d 1058 (1990).
The petitioner owned 40 acres of land in an exclusive
farm use zone and wanted to conduct surface shale mining on
the property.  The court held that the nonconforming use was
allowable because the 40 acres were generally unsuitable for
farming.  Clark v. Jackson County, 103 Or. App.
377, 797 P.2d 1061 (1990).
CITATION UPDATES
Moser v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir .
1990), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1989-142  (limitation of
loss deduction), see p. 192 supra.
Hudspeth v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir .
1990), aff'g on point, T.C. Memo. 1985-628  (tax
benefit rule), see p. 193 supra.
Est. of Heim v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1322 (9th
Cir. 1990), aff'g , T.C. Memo. 1988-433 (marital
deduction), see p. 203 supra.
